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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have shown that Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN) are relatively easy to attack through the generation of so
called adversarial examples. Such vulnerability also affects CNN-
based image forensic tools. Research in deep learning has shown
that adversarial examples exhibit a certain degree of transferability,
i.e., they maintain part of their effectiveness even against CNNmod-
els other than the one targeted by the attack. This is a very strong
property undermining the usability of CNN’s in security-oriented
applications. In this paper, we investigate if attack transferability
also holds in image forensics applications. With specific reference to
the case of manipulation detection, we analyse the results of several
experiments considering different sources of mismatch between the
CNN used to build the adversarial examples and the one adopted by
the forensic analyst. The analysis ranges from cases in which the
mismatch involves only the training dataset, to cases in which the
attacker and the forensic analyst adopt different architectures. The
results of our experiments show that, in the majority of the cases,
the attacks are not transferable, thus easing the design of proper
countermeasures at least when the attacker does not have a perfect
knowledge of the target detector.
Index Terms— Adversarial multimedia forensics, adversarial
machine learning, adversarial examples, attack transferability, image
forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are increasingly used in im-
age forensic applications due to their superior accuracy in detecting
a wide number of image manipulations, including multiple JPEG
compression [1, 2], median filtering [3], resizing [4], contrast ma-
nipulation [5]. Good performance of CNNs have also been reported
for image source attribution, i.e., to identify the model of the camera
which acquired a certain image [6–8]. Despite the good performance
they achieve, the use of CNNs in security-oriented applications, like
image forensics, is hindered by the easiness with which adversarial
examples can be built [9–11]. As a matter of fact, an attacker who
has access to the internal details of the CNN used for a certain image
recognition task can easily build an attacked image which is visually
indistiguishable from the original one, but is misclassified by the
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CNN. Such a problem is currently the subject of an intense research
activity, yet no satisfactory solution has been found yet (see [12] for
a recent survey on this topic). The problem is worsened by the obser-
vation that adversarial attacks are often transferrable from the target
network to other networks designed for the same task [13]. This
means that even in a Limited Knowledge (LK) scenario, wherein the
attacker has only partial information about the to-be-attacked net-
work, he can attack a surrogate network mimicking the target one
and the attack will be effective also on the target network with good
probability. Such a property opens the way towards very powerful
attacks that can be used in real applications wherein the attacker does
not have full access to the attacked system [13].
Following some recent researches, showing that CNN-based im-
age forensics tools are also endangered by the existence of adversar-
ial examples [14,15], the goal of this paper is to investigate if and to
which extent the transferability of adversarial examples holds in im-
age forensics applications. The answer to this question is of primary
importance, since attack transferability would greatly complicate the
development of anti-counter-forensics measures. In fact, even deny-
ing to the attacker a full access to the forensic tools would not guar-
antee that the forger can not mislead the forensic analysis. To the
best of our knowledge, the only previous work partially addressing
this problem is [15]. In particular, [15] reports some tests aiming
at assessing the transferability of adversarial examples targeting var-
ious CNN-based camera model identification systems. According
to [15], in a camera model identification scenario, attacks are only
partially transferable, since the transferred attack succeed in no more
than 40% of the cases (often much less). The analysis in [15] is a
very preliminary one, hence calling for new tests addressing different
sources of mismatch between the attacked network and the targeted
one, different forensics scenarios, and the impact that attack strength
has on the transferability of the attacks. In this paper, we make some
steps in this direction. First of all, we consider two forensic tasks
boiling down to a binary detection problem. This marks an important
difference with respect to [15], where the forensic analysis consisted
in the classification of the input image into one of several classes
rather than in making a binary decision. Specifically we focus on
median filtering and image resizing detection. Secondly, we analyse
separately the effect of training data mismatch and network architec-
ture mismatch on the transferability of the attacks. We consider two
different attack methodologies, namely JSMA [11] and FGSM [16]
and evaluate the transferability of the attacks also in the presence of
double-to-integer rounding, which is a necessary step to bring back
the attacked image into the integer domain. As we will see, our
experiments cast serious doubts on the transferability of adversarial
attacks in image forensic applications, thus opening the way to the
development of proper countermeasures at least when the attacker
does not have a perfect knowledge of the target network.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we
describe the methodology used for our experiments, including: i)
the description of the algorithms used to generate the adversarial
examples; ii) the description of the CNN architectures targeted by
the attacks; iii) the description of the experimental campaign, iv)
the datasets used for training and testing the CNNs. The results of
the experiments are presented in Sect. 3, together with a discussion
of our main findings. The paper ends in Sect. 4, where we sum-
marise the lessons we learnt from our experiments and we present a
roadmap for future research.
2. METHODOLOGY
In order to evaluate the factors that influence the transferability of
adversarial attacks against CNN-based detection of image process-
ing operators, we considered two different kinds of attacks, two de-
tection tasks solved by relying on two different networks, and three
sources of mismatch between the network used to create the adver-
sarial attack (hereafter referred to as Source Network - SN) and the
one the attack should be transferred to (hereafter referred to as Tar-
get Network - TN). In particular we considered the cases of two dif-
ferent networks trained on the same dataset and the case of a single
network trained on different datasets. With reference to the terminol-
ogy established in [13], we refer to the first type of transferability as
cross-model transferability and to the second as cross-training trans-
ferability. We also considered the case of two different networks
trained on different datasets (cross-model-and-training transferabil-
ity). The combination of the above factors resulted in an extensive
campaign of experiments whose results will be discussed in Sect. 3.
2.1. Attacks
In our experiments, the adversarial examples were built by rely-
ing on the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) algorithm, origi-
nally proposed in [16], and the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [11].
For the FGSM, we used the refined iterative version (I-FGSM)
described in [17]. In its original implementation, FGSM obtains an
adversarial perturbation in a computationally efficient way by com-
puting the gradient of the output with respect to the input image and
considering its sign multiplied by a strength factor εs. The I-FGSM
algorithm is a multi-step variant of FGSM; for a given attack strength
εs, the algorithm is applied iteratively until an adversarial image can
be produced (that is, an image which is misclassified by the net-
work), for a maximum number of steps S. Several values of εs are
considered, i.e. εs ∈ E; the value which minimizes the distortion
of the final attacked image with respect to the original one is even-
tually selected as best strength, for the given maximum number of
iterations of the algorithm S.
The JSMA algorithm, has been proposed by Papernot et al. in
[11] and works as follows: it consists of a greedy iterative procedure
which relies on forward propagation to compute, at each iteration, a
saliency map, indicating the pixels that contribute most to the classi-
fication. The pixels are then modified based on this map by a relative
amount θ, θ < 1 (θ is relative to the range of the values of the image,
the pixel modification being θ×(max(I)−min(I))). A constrain is
put on the maximum number of times T the same pixel can be mod-
ified. The procedure ends when the attacker succeeds or the pixels
are modified by a too large amount (i.e., the number of modifications
reaches the maximum prescribed number for all pixels).
In our experiments we used the Foolbox toolbox [18] to imple-
ment the above attacks.
Both the I-FGSM and the JSMA algorithms produce a real-
valued attacked image. While in some cases we can assume that
the attacked image is used as is, in most applications image pixels
must be mapped back into the integer domain before being fed to
the CNN. This may result in a loss of effectiveness of the attack,
since some of the subtle changes introduced by the attack are deleted
when pixels are rounded (or truncated) to integer values.
2.2. Datasets
In order to evaluate the transferability of the attacks when the SN and
the TN are trained on different datasets, we considered the RAISE
(R) [19] dataset and the VISION (V) dataset [20].
For our experiments, about 2000 uncompressed, camera-native,
images (.tiff) were taken from the RAISE dataset, with size 4288 ×
2848. These images are camera-native images coming from three
different cameras. The same number of images were taken from the
VISION dataset. This dataset consists of native images acquired by
smartphones/tablets belonging to several brands. To get similar res-
olution images for the two datasets, we only selected the devices
for which the resolution was not very different from that of the im-
ages from RAISE. Specifically, the sizes of the images we consid-
ered ranges from a minimum of 2336 × 4160 up to 3480 × 4640.
The images from the VISION dataset are in JPEG format. In order to
reduce the possible impact of compression artefact, we selected im-
ages only from the high-quality devices, for which the JPEG Quality
Factor is larger than 97.
The images from both R and V datasets were split into training
(and validation) set and test set, and then processed to produce the
images for the manipulated class, namely, median and resizing. For
all our tests we considered one-channel images, then all the images
from R and V were converted to gray-scale.
2.3. Networks
In our experiments, we considered two different detection tasks,
namely detection of image resizing (downsampling, by a 0.8 factor)
and detection of median filtering (by a 5× 5 window). To cope with
them, we built several networks generally indicated as N trar(task),
where ”ar” indicates the architecture of the network, ”tr” ∈ {R, V}
the dataset used for training and ”task” ∈ {med, res} the detection
task (”med” indicating median filtering and ”res” resizing).
With regard to the architectures, we considered the network in
[21] (recently extended in [4]), hereafter referred to as BSnet (”ar” =
BS), and the one in [5], hereafter denoted as GCnet (”ar” = GC).
BSnet, originally proposed for image manipulation detection and
classification, consists of 3 convolutional layers, 3 max-pooling lay-
ers and 3 fully-connected layers. Residual-based features are ex-
tracted by constraining the filters of the first layer (with 5× 5 recep-
tive field), by enforcing a high-pass nature of the filters (see [4] for
more details). For the second and third convolutional layers the filter
size is set to 7 × 7 and 5 × 5 respectively, and the stride is set to 2.
For the max-pooling, a kernel size 3× 3 is used with stride 2.
GCnet was originally proposed to detect generic contrast adjust-
ment operators. With respect to BSnet, GCnet is significantly deeper,
consisting of 9 convolutional layers. The network has only 2 max-
pooling layers and one fully-connected layer. A kernel size of 3× 3
and stride 1 was used for all the convolutional layers. Max-pooling
is applied with kernel size 2× 2 and stride 2. The number of param-
eters is then reduced by halving the number of feature maps in the
final convolutional layer, and considering just one fully-connected
layer.
In summary, we built 6 networks, indexed as follows: N trBS(task),
”tr” ∈ {R, V}, ”task” ∈ {med, res}, and NRGC(task) with ”task” ∈
{med, res}.
2.4. Experiments
The experimental campaign was designed in such a way to high-
light attack transferability in a wide variety of settings. Experiments
have been split into three categories according to the type of mis-
match between the SN and the TN. We started studying cross-model
transferability, according to which SN and TN share the same ar-
chitecture, but are trained on different datasets. Then we passed to
analyse cross model transferability, in which different network ar-
chitectures are trained on the same dataset. Eventually, we passed
to cross-model-and-training transferability according to which the
SN and the TN share neither the architecture nor the training data.
All the tests have been repeated for both resizing and median filter-
ing detection. For sake of simplicity we did not consider all possible
combinations, however, as it will be evident from the subsequent sec-
tion, the amount of experiments we carried out is sufficient to draw
a number of significant conclusions. In particular, the experiments
for the cross-training transferability are carried out by considering
only BSnet as the SN, trained on both R (i.e., SN = NRBS) and V
(i.e., SN = NRBS). For the experiments on the model-training trans-
ferability, BSnet is taken as SN and GCnet as TN, both trained on
R (i.e., SN = NRBS and TN = N
R
GC). Finally, for the cross-model-
and-training case, we set SN = NVBS and TN = N
R
GC.
With regard to the attacks, for the I-FGSM attack, the number
of steps S is fixed to 10 (default). The best strength is searched in
the range E = [0 : εs : 0.1], where εs is the search step size,
which also corresponds to the minimum strength considered. Setting
a larger εs generally corresponds to consider a stronger attack. In our
experiments, we considered εs = 0.001 and 0.01, which satisfy the
condition that the average PSNR remains above 40 dB.
For the JSMA, T is set to 7. The algorithm is applied with the
default maximum number of iterations 2000. The relative modifica-
tion per pixel θ is set to 0.01 and 0.1, the second case corresponding
to a stronger attack. We did not consider θ values larger than 0.1,
since above this value the maximum pixel distortion introduced by
the attack starts becoming too large (> 70).
Eventually, we repeated all the experiments by rounding the out-
put of the attack to integer values.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the results of the experiments we have
carried out, by considering separately the cases of cross-training,
cross-model and cross-model-and-training transferability. For sake
of brevity, we will focus on the floating point version of the attacks,
being this case more favorable to the attacker, and we will briefly
touch upon the integer-valued case at the end of the section.
3.1. Training
To build our models NRBS and N
V
BS (for both detection tasks), we
considered 200.000 patches for training (and validation) and 10000
for testing, per class. The input patch size is set to 128 × 128 in all
the cases. In order to use all the images in the datasets R and V ,
a maximum number of 100 patches is selected (randomly) for each
image. A number of 30 training epochs was considered (as in [21]).
For the deeper models NRGC for both the ”med” and ”res” task, we
used 106 patches for training, 105 for validation, and 5 ∗ 104 for
testing. To reach these numbers, all the image patches were selected
from all the images. By following [5], the number of training epochs
is set to 3. For training both BSnet and GCnet, the Adam solver is
used with learning rate 10−4 and momentum 0.99. The batch size
for training and validation is set to 32 images, the test batch size to
100. The accuracies achieved by the BSnet in absence of attacks in
the various cases are: 98.1% for NRBS(med), 99.5% for N
V
BS(med),
97.5% for NRBS(res), 96.6% for N
V
BS(res). With regard to GCnet, it
got the following accuracies: 98.4% for NRGC(med) and 98.5% for
N
R
GC(res).
In the next section, we discuss the performance of the models in
the presence of attacks, in the matched and mismatched cases. In all
the cases, the performance are assessed on 500 attacked images.
3.2. Cross-training transferability
As detailed in Sect. 2.4, these experiments were carried out by con-
sidering only the BS architecture. The results we got are reported in
Table 1. For all the cases, the PSNR, L1 distortion and maximum
absolute distortion are reported, averaged on all the images success-
fully attacked in the matched case. As we can see, the attacks are
generally non-transferable and the images attacked using SN are not
able to deceive the TN. More specifically, with the FGSM attack,
the adversarial examples can be transferred in a significant number
of cases only when the larger strength is considered (εs = 0.01)
and the SN corresponds to NRBS(res) and N
R
BS(med) (attack success
rate 0.6923 and 0.8452 respectively) and toNVBS(res) (attack success
rate 0.9415). For the JSMA case, the attack can be transferred only
when SN is NRBS(res) and strong attack with θ = 0.1 is considered,
with success rate 0.7821. Furthermore, we observe that the JSMA is
never transferable when the VISION dataset is used to train the SN.
According to our tests, attacks obtained by JSMA are less trans-
ferable than those produced by FGSM. A possible motivation can be
the following: since very few pixels are modified by JSMA (those
which the network is more sensitive to), it tends to overfit more the
attacked model. It is also interesting to observe that, for a given de-
tection task, the transferability is not symmetric with respect to the
datasets used for training. This suggests that, in forensic applica-
tions, the features learned by the network may also be affected in
some way and up to some extent by the underlying dataset. This
point deserves further investigation as a future work.
3.3. Cross-model transferability
In this case, the experiments where carried out by considering only
the R dataset and using the BS architecture for the SN. The results
we have got are reported in Table 2. The experiments show the lack
of transferability with respect to a mismatch in the network model.
The only exception is for the ”med” case, in which case the stronger
attack (with εs = 0.01) is transferable 82.5% of the times. How-
ever, it is worth stressing that, when the FGSM is applied with such
a strength, although the PSNR is not very low (40.03 dB), the av-
erage L1 distortion is around 2.5 (a similar value is attained by the
maximum absolute distortion). With such values of L1, the visual
quality of the FGSM attacked images is impaired and peculiar visual
artifacts appears, especially in relatively uniform image patches.
The fact that the lack of transferability is even stronger in the
”res” case than in the ”med” case can be probably justified by the
ease of the median filtering detection task (even because the median
filtering is performed with a rather large window size), compared to
the resize. Therefore, we might expect that in the case of ”med” sim-
ilar peculiar features are learned by the shallow and deeper network,
hence facilitating the transferability of the attacks.
Table 1. Experimental results for Cross Training case. Transferable attacks are highlighted in bold.
CROSS TRAINING
SN TN accuracy attack type avg. PSNR avg. L1 dist avg. max. dist attack success rate on SN attack success rate on TN
N
R
BS(res) N
V
BS(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 96.00% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.02 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.6923
N
R
BS(res) N
V
BS(res) SN=97.60%, TN= 96.00% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 58.46 0.26 0.27 1.0000 0.0491
N
R
BS(res) N
V
BS(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 96.00% JSMA, θ = 0.1 46.04 0.07 58.32 1.0000 0.7821
N
R
BS(res) N
V
BS(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 96.00% JSMA, θ = 0.01 54.99 0.04 15.09 0.99 0.11
N
V
BS(res) N
R
BS(res) SN= 97.80%, TN= 99.60% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.03 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.0021
N
V
BS(res) N
R
BS(res) SN= 97.80%, TN= 99.60% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 59.64 0.26 0.27 1.0000 0.0000
N
V
BS(res) N
R
BS(res) SN= 97.80%, TN= 99.60% JSMA, θ = 0.1 50.55 0.01 69.42 0.99 0.00
N
V
BS(res) N
R
BS(res) SN= 97.80%, TN= 99.60% JSMA, θ = 0.01 57.78 0.01 17.06 0.98 0.0000
N
R
BS(med) N
V
BS(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.03 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.8452
N
R
BS(med) N
V
BS(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 59.67 0.26 0.27 1.00 0.04
N
R
BS(med) N
V
BS(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% JSMA, θ = 0.1 49.64 0.03 38.11 1.0000 0.0122
N
R
BS(med) N
V
BS(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% JSMA, θ = 0.01 58.47 0.02 14.05 0.98 0.0020
N
V
BS(med) N
R
BS(med) SN= 100%, TN= 99.20% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.04 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.9415
N
V
BS(med) N
R
BS(med) SN= 100%, TN= 99.20% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 59.94 0.25 0.25 1.0000 0.07
N
V
BS(med) N
R
BS(med) SN= 100%, TN= 99.20% JSMA, θ = 0.1 49.55 0.03 32.09 1.0000 0.0101
N
V
BS(med) N
R
BS(med) SN= 100%, TN= 99.20% JSMA, θ = 0.01 58.13 0.01 14.08 0.9879 0.0081
Table 2. Experimental results for Cross Model case. Transferable attacks are highlighted in bold.
CROSS MODEL
SN TN Accuracy w/o attack attack avg. PSNR avg. L1 dist avg. max. dist attack success rate on SN attack success rate on TN
N
R
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 98.20% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.02 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.0020
N
R
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 98.20% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 58.48 0.31 0.33 1.0000 0.0020
N
R
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 98.20% JSMA, θ = 0.1 46.09 0.07 57.88 1.0000 0.0164
N
R
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 97.60%, TN= 98.20% JSMA, θ = 0.01 54.98 0.04 15.14 0.9918 0.0061
N
R
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.03 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.8248
N
R
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 59.67 0.26 0.27 1.0000 0.1813
N
R
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% JSMA, θ = 0.1 49.64 0.03 38.11 1.0000 0.0102
N
R
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 98.20%, TN= 100% JSMA, θ = 0.01 58.47 0.02 14.05 0.9837 0.0163
Table 3. Experimental results for Cross Training and Model case. Transferable attacks are highlighted in bold.
CROSS-TRAINING-AND-MODEL
SN TN Accuracy w/o attack attack avg. PSNR avg. L1 dist avg. max. dist attack success rate on SN attack success rate on TN
N
V
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 99.20%, TN= 99.60% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.03 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.0040
N
V
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 99.20%, TN= 99.60% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 59.57 0.27 0.27 1.0000 0.0020
N
V
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 99.20%, TN= 99.60% JSMA, θ = 0.1 50.20 0.02 70.87 1.0000 0.0000
N
V
BS(res) N
R
GC(res) SN= 99.20%, TN= 99.60% JSMA, θ = 0.01 57.40 0.01 17.16 0.9919 0.0000
N
V
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 100%, TN= 100% I-FGSM, εs = 0.01 40.04 2.53 2.55 1.0000 0.7960
N
V
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 100%, TN= 100% I-FGSM, εs = 0.001 59.91 0.25 0.26 1.0000 0.0080
N
V
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 100%, TN= 100% JSMA, θ = 0.1 49.56 0.03 31.83 1.0000 0.0080
N
V
BS(med) N
R
GC(med) SN= 100%, TN= 100% JSMA, θ = 0.01 58.06 0.01 14.18 0.9900 0.0120
3.4. Cross-model-and-training transferability
In this case, the experiments were carried out by considering the
BS architecture trained on the V dataset as the SN, and the GC ar-
chitecture trained on the R dataset as the TN. Similar results can
be obtained by combining architecture and dataset in the other way
round. The results we have got are reported in Table 3. Quite ex-
pectedly, the table shows that the transferability of the attacks in this
case decreases further and the attack success rate is below 0.01 in
all the cases but for the case of FGSM with εs = 0.01, for which a
success rate of 0.796 can still be achieved.
Lastly, we repeated all the experiments by rounding the pixel
values of the attacked images to integers. According to the results
we have got, integer rounding does not have a big impact on the
transferability of the attacks. Rather it influences the effectiveness
of the attack on the SN itself, as already reported in several studies
including [15] and [22].
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We investigated the transferability of adversarial examples in an im-
age forensics scenario. By focusing on two manipulation detection
tasks, we run tests by considering two well known attack method-
ologies and several sources of mismatch. Our tests show that adver-
sarial examples are generally non-transferable, in contrast to what
happens in typical patter recognition applications. This states an im-
portant result, since the lack of transferability can be exploited by
the forensic analyst to make the attack more difficult. For instance, a
LK scenario can be enforced in some way to combat adversarial ex-
amples, as done with the approaches based on standard ML. Even if
our results clearly show that adversarial examples can not be easily
transferred from one network to another, further tests are needed be-
fore we can draw some final conclusions. First of all, more detection
tasks should be considered, together with different sources of mis-
match between the SN and the TN. As an example, we may wonder
if a mismatch in the training procedure is enough to prevent transfer-
ability. Also, the reason why image-forensic networks are less prone
to attack transfers should be understood. On the attacker’s hand,
new research is needed to understand how the transferability could
be improved by increasing the attack strength, especially when the
adversarial examples must be mapped back in the integer domain.
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